The need for a theory of justice relates to the discipline of engagement in reasoning about a subject on which it is as eminent author Burke noted, very difficult to speak. It is sometimes claimed that justice is not a matter of reasoning at all; it is one of being appropriately sensitive and having the right note for injustice. It is easy to be tempted to think along these lines. When we find, for example, a raging famine, it seems natural to protest rather than reason elaborately about justice and injustice. And yet a calamity would be a case of injustice only if it could have been prevented, and particularly if those who could have undertaken preventive action had failed to try. Reasoning in some form cannot but be involved in moving from the observation of a tragedy to the diagnosis of injustice. Further more, cases of injustice may be much more complex and subtle than the assessment of an observable calamity. There could be different arguments suggesting disparate conclusions, and evaluations of justice may be anything but straight forward. The avoidance of reasoned justification often comes not from indignant protestors but from placid guardians of order and justice. Reticence has appealed throughout history to those with a governing role, endowed with public authority, who are unsure of the grounds for action, or unwilling to scrutinize the basis of their policies. The requirements of a theory of justice include bringing reason into play in the diagnosis of justice and injustice. Over hundreds of years, writers on justice in different parts of the world have attempted to provide the intellectual basis for moving from a general sense of injustice to particular reasoned diagnosis of injustice.
What is central to the theory of justice?
